, and Besanko and Thakor (1987) (1991) report that the actual average loss for Canadian-chartered banks for domestic loans during [1987] [1988] [1989] was 0.39% of average outstanding loans.
The subsidies and loss rates in government loan programs make it necessary to look for alternative rationalizations for such programs.
One promising approach is to analyze government financing of private investment as public investment decisions with private sector firms being the instruments of public investment. Stated in these terms, the financing of private sector investment can be justified as second best rules for public investment in a regime of disequilibrium in the labor and capital markets. Marchand, Mintz, and Pestieau (1985) have justified public investment in a regime under which both the real wage and the real rate of interest are set too high to clear the labor and capital markets.3 Implicit shadow prices for labor and capital are shown to be less than market prices. This theory provides a welfare-theoretic justification for government loans.
Studies of the social benefits of government loans such as Break (1965) and Bosworth, Carron, and Rhyne (1987) evaluate a government loan by focusing on the magnitude of the government subsidy contained in government credit as a basis for establishing whether the social benefits are at least equal to the subsidy. In empirical work using U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) data, Rhyne (1988) Marchand et al. (1985) such that public investment is justifiable as a second best investment rule.
THE BENEFITS OF A LOAN GUARANTEE
The benefits of a loan guarantee are assumed to be given by the income generated and is captured by the net income of the project. When there is no economic slack, the real productive activity associated with the loan may lead to the displacement of the income of competing nonborrowing businesses. Our assumed involuntary unemployment implies that the income resulting from the loan is a net addition with the annual net income for a single project given by Y.
The present value at time 0 of the perpetual benefit on a default-free loan is where r8 is the social discount rate. Ex ante, the duration of the expected benefits of a loan depends on the survival of the borrowing firm. The uncertainty associated with the duration of benefits is captured by specifying a survival distribution of firms in the loan portfolio. Firms are thus assumed to be exposed to a loan spell at the initiation of the loan, with the spell lasting for the loan period. If the firm defaults, the spell ends and the firm is deemed to have failed. If the firm survives the loan spell, it is assumed to continue forever. The latter assumption, although strong, is increasingly inconsequential in an intertemporal setting the longer the loan term.
There are several equivalent methods of characterizing the probability distribution of the survival of firms over time.6 Let T = the survival time of a randomly selected firm, where survival time covers all states in which the firm is not in default including the period beyond the loan term. The survival time T is a random variable with probability density function given by The cumulative distribution is F(t) = Prob(T< t) or the probability that spell duration time T is less than some fixed value t, whereas the survivor function S(t) = Prob(T > t) = 1 -F(t) is the probability that survival time will equal or exceed a given value t.7 For a loan with a payment term of t*, the probability that the firm will not default during the loan term is S(t*).
The hazard rate (h(t)) is the conditional probability that a firm completes its spell at t given that it has survived to t and is related to the probability distribution and survival distribution through h(t) = f(t)lS(t). The function h(t) characterizes the immediate risk attached to firms known to have survived to a given age t and is thus the transition rate from survival to failure. Over the lifetime of a firm, the rate at which society loses the benefits of the loan in each year is the transition rate from survival to failure during that year and is given by h(t).
Define Y(t) as the &dquo;hazard-adjusted benefit&dquo; of a loan during period t.
Then the expected benefit of the loan during t after deducting the benefit loss resulting from failure during t is Y(t)
The annual hazard-adjusted benefit over the loan term is given by the following set of equations:
Assuming that the hazard-adjusted benefit in the final year of the loan is sustained permanently, and letting we can more compactly specify Y(t) as follows:
The present value of the hazard-adjusted benefits of a loan is THE SOCIAL COST OF A GOVERNMENT LOAN GUARANTEE Mintz, Carriere, and McCaughey (1984) The survival estimates for the total sample are presented in Table  4 . The probability estimates for the survivor function and the hazard function all satisfy a 95% confidence interval for the normal distribution. The cumulative survival rate is .7281, indicating that 27% of firms in the program fail in the long run. The hazard function rises and falls, peaking during the second year of the loan with the probability of a surviving firm failing at that point in time being .13. A slight Equations (3) and (4) 
